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Abstract 
This paper proposes a novel method of preventing shellcode execution even if DEP is bypassed. The method 
prevents Windows APIs from calling on a data area by API hooking, based on evidence that shellcode is executed in 
a data area and that the shellcode calls Windows APIs. Performance tests indicated that all samples of shellcode 
provided by Metasploit Framework, as well as the 18 most recent attacks using Metasploit Framework, can be detected. 
Comparison of this method with anti-virus products showed that this method prevented shellcode execution, whereas 
anti-virus products failed. Another test showed that the overhead of the method has little effect on the performance of 
computer operations. 
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1. Introduction 
Cyber-attacks on the vulnerabilities of client-side applications, such as Internet Explorer and Adobe Flash Player, 
have been increasing [1-2]. Traditional defenses against such attacks involve the use of anti-virus software and keeping 
all applications including their plugins up to date. However, a zero-day attack that exploits a previously unknown 
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vulnerability is a critical problem, because the pattern-matching methods most frequently used by anti-virus software 
cannot detect a zero-day attack even if all applications are up to date. 
The Information-Technology Promotion Agency in Japan reported that zero-day vulnerabilities accounted for 
approximately 16% of all vulnerabilities in Microsoft products between November 2013 and April 2014 [3]. In 
addition, Trend Micro reported that, in 2013, it took on average 30 days to provide programs for security updates [4], 
indicating that traditional methods are insufficient to prevent zero-day attacks. 
Microsoft introduced Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [5] to prevent such attacks on Windows XP Service Pack 
2 and later. DEP prevents code from being executed on a data area such as a stack or a heap. However, return-oriented 
programming (ROP) [6], which allows attackers to execute code on a data area, has been used from around 2008. 
ROP is commonly used for DEP bypass, either by disabling DEP or by allowing code to be executed on the data area. 
This allows the execution of a small piece of executable code, called “shellcode,” because ROP is strongly restricted 
to a small number of instruction sequences within modules loaded in memory. 
To prevent ROP code execution, many methods of ROP code detection have been tested. These methods can be 
divided roughly into static software hardening [7-10] and runtime monitoring solutions [11-17]. Although effective in 
preventing ROP code execution, these methods cannot prevent code execution without using ROP. For example, the 
vulnerability of memory corruption can allow DEP bypass without using ROP [18]. 
Shellcode detection can be roughly divided into three methods: pattern matching [19], heuristic [20], and emulation 
[21-24] methods. Since pattern matching methods require pattern data to detect shellcodes, they may miss detecting 
new shellcodes due to an absence of pattern data. In addition, polymorphic and metamorphic shellcodes can produce 
so many patterns that it may be difficult to cover all patterns [25]. The heuristic method attempts to detect shellcode 
such as consecutive NOP sequences, i.e., NOP sleds, or sequences that get a program counter. However, some NOP 
sleds are polymorphic [25], and the shellcode may not get the program counter. Emulation methods, which emulate 
input data through a network or removable devices such as a program code, can correctly detect shellcodes, but at 
very slow speed. In addition, the computational costs of the heuristic and emulation methods are high because these 
methods must parse data format to extract shellcode for every application or protocol. For example, an attack on the 
vulnerability of Internet Explorer sends shellcode in Unicode format of JavaScript; thus, these methods must parse 
HTML code and JavaScript code. 
In this paper, we propose and implement a novel method to prevent shellcode execution even if DEP is bypassed. 
We call this method “SecondDEP”, after the feature of the method that plays the role of a second DEP. SecondDEP 
prevents Windows APIs from calling on a data area by API hooking, based on circumstance evidence that shellcode 
is executed in the data area and that the shellcode calls Windows APIs. SecondDEP provides resilient computing that 
rescues program control from shellcode by API hooking. 
2. DEP and DEP bypass 
An attack on a software vulnerability such as a buffer overflow attack runs a small piece of executable code, called 
a shellcode, by exploiting the vulnerability on a target computer. Nowadays, shellcodes are commonly used to 
download malware (e.g., a remote administration tool and a Trojan horse) from the Internet and to infect the target 
computer with the malware. 
This section describes the mechanism of executing the shellcode by the stack buffer overflow attack, and the 
mechanism of preventing it from being executed by DEP and bypassing DEP. 
2.1. Shellcode execution by a stack buffer overflow attack 
A stack buffer overflow is an anomaly, in which a program writes data to a buffer in memory on a stack beyond 
the buffer’s boundary. The stack includes the caller’s local variables, the callee function’s argument, a return address 
to return program control to the caller function, a stack frame pointer address, and the callee function’s local variables, 
in that order (Fig. 1). 
The critical data of the attack is the return address. The attack overwrites the return address with the entry address 
of the shellcode by writing big data to the callee function’s variable (Fig. 1). When the callee function returns to the 
caller function, the program transfers program control not to the caller function, but to the shellcode. The shellcode 
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can be located in the callee function’s variable on the stack or in the buffer on other data areas such as a heap, resulting 
in the injection of shellcode (e.g., heap spraying). 
 
Fig. 1. Stack buffer overflow attack. 
2.2. DEP 
DEP [5] is a security feature that prevents shellcode from being executed. DEP marks a data area of memory as 
either “executable” or “non-executable”, and allows only data in an “executable” code area to be executed by programs. 
For example, DEP prevents code from being executed from data areas such as the heap, stacks, and memory pools. If 
a program attempts to execute code from a protected data area, a memory access violation exception occurs; if the 
exception is not handled, the calling process is terminated. However, DEP is not intended to be a comprehensive 
defense against all exploitation. 
2.3. ROP 
ROP [6] is a technique that allows attackers to execute code on a protected data area. DEP cannot prevent ROP 
code from being executed, because ROP executes only a gadget, consisting of a few machine code instruction 
sequences in an executable code area within modules, such as .EXE and .DLL files, loaded in memory. Each gadget 
typically ends in a RET instruction. ROP pushes a chain of the addresses of gadgets on the stack. Once program control 
is transferred to one gadget, the chain of gadgets is called by the RET instruction at the end of each gadget. 
2.4. DEP bypass 
ROP allows attackers to execute code even if DEP is enabled. However, ROP has difficulty calling arbitrary APIs, 
because ROP is strongly restricted to gadgets within modules loaded in memory. Hence, ROP is commonly used for 
DEP bypass, either by disabling DEP or by marking an area as “executable.” The latter is most frequently used. For 
example, a chain of ROP gadgets calls VirtualProtect, which can mark the data area containing shellcode as 
“executable,” and then execute the shellcode. 
3. SecondDEP: Shellcode execution prevention by API hooking 
API hooking is a technique used to modify an API function by intercepting the API call. SecondDEP hooks APIs 
likely to be called by shellcode and immediately exits the process that calls the API if the latter is called in a data area. 
However, applications do not necessarily call APIs in the data area. In fact, many applications call SetLastError in the 
data area. Therefore, SecondDEP does not hook such APIs, which cause false detection. Such APIs are described in 
Section 5. 
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The determination as to whether or not API is called in a data area is based on the value of the Type member in 
the MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION structure retrieved using VirtualQueryEx. The Type member can be one of 
the following values: MEM_IMAGE, MEM_MAPPED, and MEM_PRIVATE. MEM_IMAGE indicates that the memory area is 
mapped into the view of an image section that includes executable code, i.e., the contents of an .EXE or.DLL file. The 
Type member is reliable because there is no way to change its value using API in user space. Therefore, SecondDEP 
retrieves the Type member of the memory where an API is called and determines that the API is called in the data 
area if the value of the Type member is not MEM_IMAGE. 
The APIs likely to be called by the shellcode depend on the aim of the attackers. For example, if the attacker intends 
to infect a target computer with malware, shellcode may call URLDownLoadToFIleA of URLMON.DLL to download 
the malware from the Internet, and then may call WinExec of KERNEL32.DLL to execute the malware. In this case, 
SecondDEP only has to hook WinExec. However, malware may be executed not only by WinExec, but by 
CreateProcessW and others. Therefore, SecondDEP should hook as many APIs as possible without slowing down 
computer operations. We discuss how many APIs should be hooked in Section 5. 
4. Implementation of a prototype system 
SecondDEP consists of two modules, HOOK.DLL and DllLoader.exe. HOOK.DLL performs API hooking, while 
DllLoader.exe loads HOOK.DLL into the process of Explorer. 
There are two methods of API hooking, import address table and inline function hooking [26-27]. The former 
replaces the address of an API on an import address table with the address of the hook function. The latter replaces a 
few machine code instructions at the entry of an API with JMP instructions to the hook function. Unfortunately, the 
former cannot detect shellcode, because shellcode does not retrieve the address of the API from the import address 
table. Therefore, SecondDEP employs inline function hooking. A well-known library for inline function hooking is 
Detours [28-29], which is provided by Microsoft Research. Detours has a free edition, named Detours Express 3.0, 
and a non-free edition, named Detours Professional 3.0. The prototype system uses Detours Express 3.0. The prototype 
system is implemented on Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 32-bit, since Detours Express 3.0 is limited to 32-bit processors 
on x86 processors. 
A hook function, which is called instead of the original API call, plays an important role in SecondDEP. The hook 
function checks whether or not an API is called in a data area. If the API is called, the hook function immediately 
exits its own process using ExitProcess; if not, the hook function calls the original API. The determination as to 
whether or not an API is called in a data area is based on the value of the Type member in 
MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION structure retrieved using VirtualQueryEx. However, the overhead of 
VirtualQueryEx cannot be ignored, because VirtualQueryEx is called too many times and requires a context-
switch between user mode and kernel mode. Therefore, once the prototype system makes sure that the caller address 
is not in the data area, it marks the address as safe. To mark and check the address quickly, the prototype system uses 
an array whose size is 0x080000, which is derived from the minimum page size in x86 architecture, i.e. 4,096 bytes, 
and the maximum size of the virtual memory in user space, i.e. 0x80000000 bytes. Consequently, this hook function 
checks the value of the array at the index derived from the equation: 
 ൌ ሺ&Ͳ͹				ͲͲͲሻ ب ͳʹǡ  
where lpReturnAddress is the return address of the API. If the value of the array is true, the hook function calls 
the original API. If not, the hook function uses VirtualQueryEx to determine whether or not the API is called in 
the data area. As a result, if the API is called in the executable code area, the hook function sets the value of the array 
at the index to true. If not, the hook function exits its own process. 
The hook functions corresponding to four APIs for process creation (i.e., CreateProcessW, CreateProcessA, 
CreateProcessAsUserW, and CreateProcessAsUserA) load HOOK.DLL into a process that may be created after 
checking whether or not the API is called in a data area. 
DllLoader.exe injects HOOK.DLL into the process of Explorer. This results in the injection of HOOK.DLL into 
all applications launched not only from Explorer, but from Desktop and Start Menu, by calling the hook function of 
CreateProcessW. This DLL injection propagates HOOK.DLL (Fig. 2), protecting all applications from shellcode 
execution, except for some applications such as PowerShell, as described in Section 5. 
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Fig. 2. DLL injection. 
5. Performance testing and tuning 
The prototype system described in Section 4 was implemented, and the performance of SecondDEP tested and 
tuned. The performance of computer operations was tested by benchmarking between disabled and enabled 
SecondDEP. This was followed by tuning the performance to reduce false detection by data execution prevention in 
a data area. Finally, the ability of SecondDEP to detect shellcode was tested and compared with the detection 
performance of popular anti-virus products. 
5.1. Benchmark of SecondDEP 
In the first step, the performance of computer operations was tested by benchmarking between disabled and enabled 
SecondDEP. The score of the benchmark would depend on how many APIs are hooked. The APIs hooked in this test 
were all those included in KERNEL32.DLL (1135 APIs) and ADVAPI32.DLL (552 APIs), which provide interfaces 
for process operations and file system operations, and WS2_32.DLL (140 APIs), URLMON.DLL (78 APIs), and 
WININET.DLL (167 APIs), which provide interfaces for network operations. APIs not included in the header files, 
such as Windows.h, WinSock2.h, and WinInet.h, were excluded. In addition, RtlUnwind was excluded, because 
this API causes stack overflow by recursively calling the hook function. 
The benchmark scores, measured by PCMark 8 Basic Edition (Table 1), showed that the overhead of SecondDEP 
had little effect on the performance of computer operations. For the rest of this section, the prototype system hooks 
all the above APIs. 
  Table 1. Benchmark scores. 
 SecondDEP disabled SecondDEP enabled 
First time 1252  1279 
Second time 1212 1244 
Third time 1258 1211 
Average 1240.7 1244.7 
5.2. Performance tuning for reducing false detection by preventing data execution in a data area 
In investigating false detection by data execution prevention in a data area for applications frequently targeted, we 
found: 
x Internet Explorer 11.0.9600.17633: False detection on calling SetLastError. 
○ Adobe Flash Player 16.0.0.305: No false detection. 
○ Silverlight 5.1.30514.0: False detection on calling TlsGetValue. 
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x Java 8 Update 31: No false detection. 
x Adobe Reader 11.0.10: False detection on calling SetLastError. 
x Office 2013 15.0.4693.1000 MSO 15.0.4693.1001: False detection on calling five APIs: SetLastError, 
EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, GetTickCount, and GetLocalTime. 
The above APIs are described below. SetLastError sets the last error code for the calling thread. TlsGetValue 
retrieves the value in the calling thread’s local storage slot for the specified TLS index. EnterCriticalSection and 
LeaveCriticalSection control mutual-exclusion synchronization. GetTickCount retrieves the number of 
milliseconds that have elapsed since the system was started. GetLocalTime retrieves the current local date and time. 
The first four of these APIs would not be used by shellcode, for nothing can come out of these APIs. The other two 
APIs may be used by shellcode to retrieve system information, but attackers cannot achieve their aims with these APIs 
alone. Therefore, the prototype system reduces false detection rates by excluding the above six APIs. 
However, additional investigation indicated that some applications call various APIs in the data area, such as 
PowerShell and Windows Media Center. In addition, applications that employ the concept of reflective programming 
[30] could be included. These APIs are included in those used by shellcodes. Therefore, SecondDEP cannot protect 
such applications from being attacked. 
5.3. Shellcode detection 
We tested a prototype system tuned to reduce false detection. Initially, we tested the ability to detect all samples of 
shellcode provided by Metasploit Framework [31], except for 14 samples that did not work correctly. In this test, each 
sample was run on a data area on which the original DEP had been disabled. The prototype system detected and 
prevented all samples from being executed. 
Next, we tested the ability of this system to detect exploits provided by Metasploit Framework. In this test, we used 
exploit modules released since 2013 and targeting well-known applications on Windows 7 32-bit. Table 2 shows the 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Identifiers (CVE-IDs) and the names of the exploit modules used in this test. 
These modules can be divided into two categories, one used mainly for penetration, and the other for escalation of 
privilege after penetration, with the latter denoted by an asterisk (*). In the testing the latter category, we did not use 
DllLoader.exe to load HOOK.DLL, but used the registry, i.e., AppInit_Dlls. This registry can inject HOOK.DLL 
into a process loaded with USER32.DLL [27], because loading of HOOK.DLL might result in the success of a first 
attack for penetration. 
We found that two attacks of CVE-2013-5045 and CVE-2014-0257 could not be detected, because these modules 
executed shellcode in the process of PowerShell. As described in Section 5.2, SecondDEP cannot protect PowerShell 
from vulnerability attacks. However, shellcode cannot be run on PowerShell before penetration in actual use, because 
an attacker is required to penetrate a target computer in advance. Therefore, SecondDEP would never allow shellcode 
to be run if it can prevent the penetration. 
     Table 2. CVE-IDs and exploit module names used in a test. 
CVE-ID Exploit module name CVE-ID Exploit module name 
2013-0074 browser/ms13_022_silverlight_script_object 2013-3893 browser/ie_setmousecapture_uaf 
2013-0634 browser/adobe_flash_regex_value 2013-3897 browser/ms13_080_cdisplaypointer 
2013-1300 local/ms13_053_schlamperei * 2013-5045 local/ms13_097_ie_registry_symlink * 
2013-1347 browser/ie_cgenericelement_uaf 2013-5331 browser/adobe_flash_filters_type_confusion 
2013-2551 browser/ms13_037_svg_dashstyle 2014-0257 local/ms14_009_ie_dfsvc * 
2013-2730 local/adobe_sandbox_adobecollabsync * 2014-0307 browser/ms14_012_textrange 
2013-3163 browser/ms13_055_canchor 2014-0322 browser/ms14_012_cmarkup_uaf 
2013-3184 browser/ms13_059_cflatmarkuppointer 2014-0497 browser/adobe_flash_avm2 
2013-3660 local/ppr_flatten_rec * 2014-0515 browser/adobe_flash_pixel_bender_bof 
2013-3881 local/ms13_081_track_popup_menu * 2014-1761 fileformat/ms14_017_rtf 
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5.4. Comparison of commercial anti-virus products and SecondDEP 
We compared the ability of commercial anti-virus products and SecondDEP to detect shellcode. Commercial 
products included: 
1. TrendMicro Premium Security (8.0.133 - JPOC008-2843) 
2. Qihoo 360 Total Security Essential (6.0.0.1022) 
3. Bitdefender Total Security 2015 (18.22.0.1521) 
4. Kaspersky Internet Security 2015 (15.0.2.361) 
5. Avira Free Antivirus (15.0.9.504) 
These products were considered the top five on Real-World Protection Tests by AV-Comparatives [32] in 2014. 
All exploits tested in Section 5.3 have been described and could be detected by all of the above products. Therefore, 
we implemented a simple web server, which has a stack buffer overflow vulnerability triggered when parsing the 
value of URI in HTTP request that allows an attacker to execute an arbitrary code, assuming a zero-day attack that 
exploits a previously unknown vulnerability. This test uses shellcode (i.e., windows/exec) provided by Metasploit 
Framework, allowing an attacker to execute an arbitrary command. 
In evaluating the detection performance of commercial products and SecondDEP, we found that SecondDEP 
successfully prevented the shellcode from being executed, but all the commercial products failed. This result suggests 
that the commercial products may detect exploits based on the patterns of exploit code, not shellcode. In addition, 
SecondDEP could be incorporated into these products as a security barrier behind exploit protection. 
6. SecondDEP bypass and its solutions 
SecondDEP may be bypassed in two ways, by shellcode execution on an executable code area and by bypassing 
API hooking. 
6.1. Shellcode execution on an executable code area and its solutions 
The prevention of API calls in a data area has a loophole. Attackers can execute shellcode if they can inject it into 
an executable code area. However, the executable code area is write-protected during program execution except in 
some cases such as module loading. The attackers must therefore remove the write-protection on the executable code 
area, by using APIs such as VirtualProtect. Therefore, attackers are regarded as calling one of these APIs to 
remove the write-protection on some executable code area, copying shellcode into that area, and then executing the 
shellcode.  
A solution of this bypass is to prevent removal of write-protection from an executable code area. The APIs that can 
remove the write-protection call a system service call, named NtProtectVirtualMemory, resulting in the removal 
of write-protection. Therefore, SecondDEP hooks NtProtectVirtualMemory, and prevents the attackers from 
removing the write-protection. 
Benign applications, however, may remove write-protection on an executable code area in some cases such as 
module loading. This solution requires allowing the removal of write-protection in benign applications. This type of 
removal can be divided into three types: module loading, API hooking, and 4-byte address modification. 
Module loading removes write-protection too many times when calling LdrLoadDll of NTDLL.DLL and 
GetProcAddress of KERNEL32.DLL. Hence, SecondDEP allows an application to remove the write-protection only 
when calling these APIs. 
API hooking removes the write-protection of the first five, seven, or 12 bytes of an API at the time of the start of 
an application and just before its end. For example, all applications of Office 2013 hook 11 APIs. Hence, SecondDEP 
needs to allow an application to remove the write-protection of the first five bytes on all APIs hooked by every 
application, although this solution is tiresome drudgery since it is dependent on applications. 
The four byte address modification removes the write-protection at the location specific to an application. Some 
applications, including all applications of Office 2013, overwrite the four byte data on the executable code area whose 
value is 0xBB40E64E just after the applications startup. Hence, SecondDEP must allow an application to remove the 
write-protection for every application, although this solution is also tiresome drudgery. 
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This solution and performance tuning for reducing false detection worked correctly for all applications (Section 
5.2). However, write-protection was removed from other benign applications. Therefore, we need to identify these 
removals of write-protection and allow applications to remove write-protection to reduce false detection rates. 
6.2. Bypass of API hooking and its solutions 
The prototype system employs a technique of inline function hooking. This API hooking replaces only the first few 
instructions with a JMP instruction to the entry address of the hook function. Hence, shellcode can call the original 
API by calling the instructions that follow the first few instructions of the original API. This bypass may be solved by 
randomly arranging the position of the JMP instruction relative to the hook function. 
Another bypass is the use of APIs not hooked by SecondDEP. A simple and easy solution is to use as many APIs 
as possible to hook those APIs. In particular, all APIs of NTDLL.DLL, which provide a system support library, should 
be hooked against future attacks. 
7. Resilience of SecondDEP 
Resilience of many creatures is backed by two mechanisms: defense and recovery mechanisms. The defense 
mechanism is based on an immune system that protects against disease. The immune system of jawed vertebrates, 
including humans, consists of an innate immune system and an adaptive immune system. Natural killer cells of the 
former destroy compromised cells, such as tumor cells or virus-infected cells. A killer T-cell of the latter, kills cells 
that are infected with viruses and other pathogens, or are damaged or dysfunctional. The recovery mechanism is based 
on cell division that produces new cells to replace damaged tissues. 
SecondDEP provides a feature of resilient computing that regains its original execution control from shellcode. 
Comparing an application process to a cell, SecondDEP corresponds to the biological immune system, because it kills 
a compromised process after regaining its original execution control. Similar to a cell, an application process should 
equip a recovery function that restarts its own process. For example, Internet Explorer can automatically recover from 
abnormal termination. SecondDEP and the recovery function make a system more resilient to cyber-attacks that 
exploit a vulnerability. 
8. Summary 
We have proposed and implemented a novel method to rescue program control from shellcode by API hooking, 
even if DEP is bypassed. The method has the following advantages. 
x Prevention of shellcode execution even if DEP is bypassed 
x No need for pattern data for shellcode detection 
x Real-time prevention of shellcode execution  
Performance tests indicated that all samples of shellcode provided by Metasploit Framework can be detected, 
including 16 of the 18 latest attacks. The two undetected attacks were not critical, because these attacks required 
penetration into a target computer in advance. Another test showed that the overhead of the method has little effect on 
the performance of computer operations. Performance tuning indicated that well-known targeted applications work 
correctly without false detection. Comparison of anti-virus products and SecondDEP showed that SecondDEP could 
prevent shellcode execution whereas anti-virus products failed to detect shellcode. Finally, we discussed how to 
bypass the method and its solutions. We are currently studying methods of implementing its solutions. 
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